The catastrophic and richly inflamed emotional events that followed Al Qaeda’s attack on the World Trade Center buildings, on September 11, 2001 rapidly escalated into the longest, most horrific and deadliest manhunt in human history. The United States already engaged in operations in the Middle East and preparing for protracted battle in Afghanistan, was already tired and attempting to recoup from decades of Cold War. Al Qaeda’s persistent protracted planning paid off, striking a death blow to the confidence of the people of the United States from coast-to-coast.
The terrorists who brought war to American soil would now be forced on the run and become the scope and target of the United States new Global War on Terror. With little explanation as to how this war would be fought, how much it cost or where it would begin, US military special operations launched immediately into numerous battlefronts located all around the globe. While a necessary and worthy campaign, this war has waged on for more than a decade, two presidential administrations and two major conventional battlefronts in Afghanistan and Iraq, both of which have aggressively competed for the nations virtually depleted special operations resources.
Stretched thin with exhaustion, over extended and battle weary, the United States, while having begun a slow withdrawal from global operations still leans forward over center of gravity and in danger of a greater or protracted deathblow on the home front. Information warfare and Intelligence are front and center to what comes next.
Mitigating Transnational Criminal and Terrorist Organizational Convergence: A Strategy for Interdiction and Countering Terrorism on the United States Domestic Front of a Global Asymmetric Battle
It is a well-established fact that Al Qaeda and other radical Islamic terrorist organizations have made contact with and struck business and operational arrangements with cartel operations in Mexico, Central and South America. It is also a well documented fact that drugs smuggled into the United States by the cartels are primarily distributed by U.S.-based motorcycle gangs, prison gangs and other criminal elements. Looking at this very small network analysis, consisting of only three links, the endpoints are connected by the same middle dot or point of contact. If given the information that all of these organizations are engaged in illegal narcotics at some level, is it likely or even highly likely that at some point within the last decade, the two endpoints will have connected on some level?
Globalization, international communications and transportation have facilitated and force multiplied the ability of once small isolated organizations. This dynamic has proven true for legitimate and illegitimate business operations. However, for purposes of this study, focus is given only to criminal and terrorist organizations operating transnational. These organizations have for various reasons begun to converge and share operational resources, training and intelligence. While the U.S. global war on terror has been primarily focused outward, and around the globe, unprecedented efforts by illegal narcotics cartels, primarily out of Mexico have begun and successfully infiltrated hundreds of cities inside the United States. This infiltration has been a point of much conjecture, and even hostility among members of Congress, the Senate and at various levels of law enforcement, the Department of Defense and the intelligence community. Squabbling over terminology, jurisdiction, and what is to be done next has now been going on for several years. The fact of the matter is this effort by the cartels has accomplished the goals of any well-run insurgency. It is therefore the position of this study that the converging interests among foreign and domestic terrorist and criminal organizations are deliberate and aimed at the destruction of the United States and are in direct and indirect relationship to the ongoing global war on terror.
Before presenting the solution for mitigation of these issues, it is imperative to develop at least a basic understanding of how the convergence of these organizations and ideologies can take place. It is also important to understand that currently existing criminal and terrorist networks in the United States can and will provide the necessary basis for massive domestic operations and unprecedented terrorist acts. These acts, however, will not likely take place in a force on force type of operation. By necessity, regardless of the resources available to both criminal and terrorist networks, it is more likely that incidents and operations will be run asymmetrically and involve small units and even single man attacks. This being the case, these small units will be supported operationally and resourced by a much larger ideological constituency.
While religious, philosophical or even cultural ideologies may not provide a basis for cohesive relations between organizations and personnel, common goals such as fundraising, intelligence and a common enemy in some cases will be sufficient for convergence. While many very learned professionals in both government and private sector believe that the greatest threat the United States currently is and will be demonstrated by what has been coined as “lone wolf” attacks, the opinion of this study concludes that there always has been and always will be disgruntled, violent individuals who will carry out or attempt to carry out lethal and even catastrophic attacks against the government and innocent civilians. However, there are many examples throughout history where criminals such as described here have been judged to be acting alone when in fact their actions and ideologies were influenced and supported by much larger networks in organizations lurking in the shadows and layers of ideological and religious extremism.
While “lone wolf” types of incidents will surely occur just as they have always occurred, it may prove tragic to accept this notion as not only the greatest current threat to the United States homeland, but also as a valid focal point for future operations for law enforcement and the intelligence community. More specifically, this study will demonstrate in principle that in most cases the lone wolf attack can and should be identified by intuitive analytics and solid advanced geospatial predictive analysis. In other words, it is likely that these individual attackers will have gained their ideas and concepts of operations through their affiliations with radical ideologies, organizations and relationships. It is imperative that intelligence analysts and investigators alike begin to realize that criminal networks, terrorist networks and transnational criminal enterprise will emerge along the fault lines of facilitating relationships. There are cases where terrorists will make coordinated attack plans, small cells will operate independently and where individuals will act based on knowledge gained and operationalized by their affiliations. It is critical that analysts and investigators develop accurate and clear understanding with respect to ideologies, networks and where emerging and convergence of these elements come together.
It is possible to begin developing this type of understanding by looking at some of the possibilities that might actually take place. Michael Barkun (1994) is a well respected expert and researcher of the racist right and has done extensive work towards understanding the Christian Identity movement. His work provides solid historical reference and an understanding into the origins and even the psychological aspects of Christian Identity. Barkun (1994) states,
It is unclear who cobbled together first complete account of the alleged diabolical origin of the Jewish people, in part because the writings of Comparet are often undated and those of Swift are often transcripts of undated sermons. Conrad Gaard had published a full version of the theory by 1960, and William Potter Gale by 1963. Since Gaard’s appears to be the earliest complete version to which a specific date can be assigned, it is best to begin with it.
Gaard considers the “serpent” a Pre-Adamaite “beast of the field,” who, acting as “Satan’s agent,” fathered Cain. (Barkun, 1994, p.177).
Accepting the fact that Michael Barkun has produced a scholarly work, and his research is accurate, it does not take long for a rational mind to discern that many of the ideas, concepts and ideologies found in Christian Identity are pure rubbish, having no historical basis, no evidence of proof and in some cases are just blatantly bizarre. As the analyst or investigator attempt to understand “the enemy” and the actual threat, it would be a great mistake to associate Christian identity as a religious belief, faith, or even religion. This becomes particularly important as the investigator or analyst attempts to understand psychological and motivational aspects behind an individual or group that might pose a threat to domestic homeland security.
Critical thinking becomes imperative to the success of the analyst. Merely stating that one is unbiased is not sufficient for a successful outcome. While it is not necessarily a topic for review and study within the scope of this document, contemporary culture in America and in many cases on a global scale have given way to variations of postmodern thinking and philosophy. Postmodernism combined with very influential aspects of pluralism have also created an environment that makes legal and ethical analytics almost impossible at times. These dynamics can have catastrophic results on an investigation or when trying to develop predictive analytics. An example of this type of postmodern thinking laced with pluralism can be seen in the writings of George and Wilcox (1996), when they stated,
Extremism flourished throughout early American history in one form or another, as it has in Europe and everywhere else on the globe throughout history. Wars, revolutions, social movements, religions, crusades, “causes” have exhibited elements of “extremism,” including those which we recognize today as “good.” Not the least of these was the American Revolution, which was preceded by a number of radical pamphleteers and seditious propagandists, not to mention traders and subversives, and even a smattering of people who would today be described as terrorists. If one were to describe the American Revolution as a seditious conspiracy fomented by a band of extremists, misfits, malcontents, and troublemakers dedicated to the overthrow of recognized authority, one might well be right on the mark. For many people, the words used to describe behavior have a lot to do with how they view it. (p. 16).
Somewhere around 20 years ago, this position would have been considered inflammatory to most American officials and generally the American public. Contemporary thinking to include and perhaps even emphasized by the media is the acceptance of all positions of either or both ends of the spectrum. When dealing with intelligence or predictive analytics, it is critical to identify baselines of information and to accept certain aspects of information as “given.” Relating this position to the writing of George and Wilcox (1996), it is important to note that they consider themselves as “unbiased” researchers. Striking a position as they have done with respect to American heritage, their position does not take into account that the reader understands matters from either a British or an American colonial worldview. Neither does it take into account the oppressive nature of British rule over the colonies at the time. This is addressed in this writing, as context and clear understanding of information will provide the basis of understanding necessary for the accurate prediction and successful mitigation of domestic attacks on the homeland regardless of whether they are “lone wolf” or organizational.
Samuel Huntington (2004) states,
Partial truths or half-truths are often more insidious than total falsehoods. The latter can be easily exposed for what they are by citing exceptions to their claims; hence, they are less likely to be accepted as the total truth. A partial truth, on the other hand, is plausible, because some evidence does support it, and it is, consequently, easy to assume that it is the total truth. (Huntington, 2004, p.37).
It is so very difficult to remain objective and to develop baselines of information that provide the substrate of pure analysis. Given that this has become more difficult because of the elements of postmodernism and pluralism, it becomes that much more important for investigators and analysts to remain as pragmatic as possible, collect and analyze available information and not close one’s eyes to the possibilities of human and organizational networking that surrounds nearly every person on the planet. Steven Emerson (2002) in his book American Jihad discusses the murder of Rabbi Meir Kahane in 1990. Emerson (2002) states,
When El-Sayeed Nosair murdered Rabbi Meir Kahane in New York City, for example, it was thought at first that he was acting alone, a crazed anti-Semite who is trying to take Middle Eastern politics into his own hands. Although the attack was on American soil, Kahane was associated with Israel and Israeli politics, not American institutions. But was he acting alone? Was he really uninterested in America? Hours after he was arrested, police raided his New Jersey apartment and carted away 47 boxes of personal papers. Much of it was in Arabic and appeared to be religious in nature. The contents were ignored — until after the first World Trade Center bombing two-and-a-half years later. Only then did investigators discover what they had missed — a road-map of an international terrorist network headquartered in the United States. (pp.43-44).
This is just one such example, but an important one nonetheless where investigators identified the trail-head of evidence, yet failed to follow it. It is rare when human dynamics are involved for any situation to be simple or even as it appears. Careful attention, especially in the times we live in, fueled by globalization and transnational industrial and economic factors, should be given to understanding network dynamics however simple or complex they may be concerning an individual that has carried out a criminal or terrorist event. Emerson (2002) goes on to say, “Nosair had been clearly involved in the new plots, and his assassination of Kahane, at first considered to be the attack of a lone crazed gunman, now emerged as part of a much wider effort.” (p.50).
When criminal intent is fueled by radical religious or ideological motivations, analysts must not only be aware of variables, but also be able to objectively factor variables into developing threat analysis. An example of this might be illustrated well in the writings of Juergensmeyer (2003) when he states,
According to Sheik Omar Abdul Rahman in an interview shortly after the 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center, a Muslim can “never call for violence,” only for “love, forgiveness and tolerance.” But he added that “if we are aggressed against, if our land is usurped, we must call for hitting the attacker and the aggressor to put an end to the aggression.” In other cases, a violent act has been justified as an exception to the rule, as when Muslim supporters of the al-Salam mosque defended the killing of Rabbi Kahane, claiming that this deed did not violate the Qur’an since Kahane was an enemy of Islam. (p.80).
It is difficult at best to make a value judgment on this statement. It is simple however, to note the inconsistency related to the statement and the rationale used to justify blatent criminal activity. At some point the analyst must decide if political correctness or pragmatic logic will win out in the process of predictive analytics. The statement begins by using the words “never” and “only.” Yet, the statement ends with an exception justifying murder. It is difficult for the American mind to process this type of duplicity. Those who are engaged in the work of protecting the homeland and national security would be well advised to make great effort in understanding that the dynamics of multiculturalism facing the intelligence community today will be more than unforgiving if logical reasoning gives way to political correctness.
Consider the following information with respect to and in context of Huntington’s concerns about “partial truths.” (Huntington 2004). Michael Scheuer (2006) writes,
With or without Osama bin Laden and with or without our allies, the clash of civilizations – Islam versus what passes for Christendom — appears to be as inevitable as it will be bloody. On this issue, bin Laden has again stated a position that makes him largely immune to criticism in the Islamic world. While Muslim leaders and clerics will genuinely deplore attacks on Christians, bin Laden’s description of Christians as rapacious Crusaders bent on converting or annihilating Muslims has the ring of historical truth — as noted, crusades are still a fresh memory and one across the Islamic world — and is validated by CNN’s real-time coverage of events that always seem to leave Muslims battered, bloodied, or dead at the hands of non-Muslims, particularly Christian and Jewish hands. (p.272).
At the time of this research, Osama bin Laden has already been neutralized. It took 10 years to locate and eliminate the threat. Understanding the psychological and emotional need to retaliate against one’s enemies is only part of the equation. It is equally important to understand when the enemy has set in motion various ill intended dynamics by causing a nation to lash out or to retaliate. In other words, an action like the catastrophic events of 9/11 may not be for the sole purpose of inflicting damage on an adversary. Perhaps it is wise to look past what we see at the surface and at face value and consider the ethos within the adversary. Perhaps the greater danger is not what has been initially inflicted in terms of several thousand innocent dead. The greater danger is the reaction that causes the target to overextend and leave vulnerable the homeland which has been taken for granted and accepted as virtually secure by comparison. While the “chase” lures away the adversary, little thought is given to guarding the rear. Massive dollars are spent on making a people “feel” safe while the government spins up rhetoric and programs in an attempt to recover confidence. And, any well studied economist understands that confidence drive a capitalist market. Perhaps then, it is also fair to reason that an enemy like Al Qaeda that has very learned operatives and scholars would also understand these dynamics. While catastrophic effects to national confidence and a national emotional churning is kept swirling by building and building on top of program after program, attention is drawn away from the real and subversive planning actions of the next attack that will come once the target adversary has exhausted itself. Also, as Scheuer suggests, small attacks initiated by individuals and small cells will keep the United States busy chasing “ghosts” and hunting “lone wolves.” (Scheuer, 2006, p.270).
There are many negative dynamics that associate with unfocussed retaliation, as contrasted with precision and deliberate retaliatory strike. It is important to understand at the roots of Bin Laden’s doctrine, he was a deep thinker and patient in planning for generally a skillfully designed result. Understanding the basic dynamic of causing one’s enemy to over extend might be important to understanding the long-term damage and vulnerability created by a decade of generally unsuccessful warfare and where the nation will be vulnerable next. How many battles have been won and great things have been done to support people of the Middle East? It is critical to understand matters through their eyes and through the eyes of the enemy rather than through an American filtered worldview. This is in no way offered as a criticism of American foreign policy or against leadership in the Department of Defense. It is offered as an additional dimension to understanding the dynamics of global, multicultural conflict, rather than a simpler force on force type of approach developed within the fiber of a country that has been at war or in conflict the majority of the last two centuries.
Scheuer (2006) additionally states,
If, then, bin Laden is killed or captured during the Afghan war, Al Qaeda will survive. In the aftermath of his department, Al Qaeda’s leaders are likely to pull in other forms of debt to protect the organization structure as the new leader – probably Ayman al-Zawahiri – takes over and comes up to speed. Given Al Qaeda’s marked professionalism, it is unlikely that the new leadership would launch a series of ill planned or inconsequential revenge attacks, although random attacks by grieving groups or individuals not under Al Qaeda’s direct control must be anticipated. For Al Qaeda, bin Laden’s patient credo of “excellent preparation… for operations of a specific type that will make an impact on the enemy” will prevail with or without his presence. (p.270).
Is this not exactly what has happened? It would be easy for the Department of Homeland Security or for any federal agency for that matter, to take credit for what amounts to basically a peaceful decade without a major incident. However, if logic prevails in the known strategies of Al Qaeda and other related radicalized Islamic organizations are taken into account, it would be more than advisable not only to pull back global operations that have caused U.S. defenses to become overextended and under resourced, but equally and rapidly to turn inward to identify, locate, mitigate and interdict those vulnerabilities that have propagated while national attention has been focused outward.
It is a well-known fact that radicalized Islamic organizations have met with and developed business dealings with Mexican and South American cartels. (Border Patrol Special Coordination Center, 2003, p.1). This information is current and timely it can be dated accurately back to events occurring just after 9/11. It is also known to every member of the law enforcement community and the military that the cartels deal primarily in the business of illegal narcotics and crimes of violence.
Consider the following information: (Transnational Criminal Organizations – TCO)
Information indicates that al-Qaeda has established connections in South America and Mexico and possibly Canada as possible staging points to mount terrorist attacks on the United States. The reporting also states that al-Qaeda is attempting to recruit Muslims from the Caribbean and may plan to infiltrate operatives from Mexico into the United States in order to establish a network of terrorists inside the United States. It has been confirmed that al-Qaeda and FARC have had meetings in Europe and Mexico to establish networks in Latin America. Also confirmed is FARC’s strong ties to the Mexican drug cartels, especially the Tijuana cartel. (Border Patrol Special Coordination Center, 2003, p.1).
Harkening back to the initial discussion about “connecting the dots,” it would be tragic if US law enforcement at all levels failed to realize converging nature of the relationships between international and transnational criminal elements. The war on terror has indeed impacted Al Qaeda and other fringe Islamic radicalized organizations. Knowing and understanding that a wounded adversary can be as dangerous or more dangerous than it was prior to the inflicted wounding, the astute intelligence analyst should be on a heightened sense of alert rather than relaxing as the war machine spins down. As stated earlier, if we have indeed established that militant Muslim organizations have engaged in the convergence of operations, fundraising and support for nearly a decade, then it will take the combined efforts of local, state and federal agencies working more closely and more diligently than ever before to find seems where these fabrics have become intertwined. Not rhetorically speaking, these organizational structures because they have been damaged or wounded by inflicted strikes post-9/11, have by necessity begun to think through and implement operational convergence. Overlapping goals and objectives will begin to reveal where these networks have converged. No longer is a narcotics unit or should a narcotics unit just be about the business of working “dope.” Gang units will come across information that is critical to national security.
Just recently the Associated Press (2011) reported,
Avowed white supremacist August Kreis III has said plenty of racist, hateful and violent things, but suggesting that his Aryan Nations group should join with al-Qaida against their common enemies – Jews and the American government – is what finally led him into legal trouble for fraud.
The FBI determined the statement was all bluster from the man who had appeared several times on The Jerry Springer Show, including an episode called “A Racist Family.” But the FBI’s investigation also led authorities to dig into his finances. They found Kreis was drawing a need-based pension for military service, yet failed to report thousands of dollars in other income. (Collins & Adcox, 2011).
Documented evidence indicates that there has been contact and operational sympathies between radical Islamic and right wing extremists. They both share similar goals and objectives with respect to the demise of the United States. One only has to remember the ethnocentric gestures of Osama bin Laden as the Central Intelligence Agency was pulling out of Afghanistan in 1989. Bin Laden very systematically used the United States for support and training and as an ally to defend against and eventually defeat the Soviets. However, he is clear in his doctrine after those events that he never considered the United States is a true ally. He was also clear that the hand of friendship toward the United States, whom he deemed as imperialist, would never be offered.
Not intending to trivialize the matter, but to deal with it in short order, it is clear in retrospective review that the United States failed to realize or accept cultural implications or even historical references that should have been used prior to, during and after the events in Afghanistan and during that decade long struggle between 1979 and 1989. America has failed because of ethnocentrism and egocentrism on many occasions over the last 200 years. However, while multiculturalism and globalization provide the catharsis of failure on this front, the same dynamics can be the very thing that allows America to survive and overcome the same threats.
Investigators need to be careful developing blanket assumptions in dismissing what on the surface appear to be bizarre statements as in the case of August Kreis. Whether or not evidence was found to link Kreis to Islamic extremists is not the primary relevant point. Analysts and investigators should be asking themselves why a white supremacist that was once a thriving head of the criminal element called the Aryan Nations would have even made such a statement. The dynamics discussed in this research should drive the investigators desire to understand not what he sees right in front of his face, but what is the origin of such a notion and are their networks that touch this individual that might cause a statement of this nature to be made. It is likely that this statement would find its origin in conversations with others, reading of documents that may or may not be available in initial collection of evidence or through other types of interactions with people, organizations and their networks of influence and ideology. There are sufficient overlaps between radical Islamic ideology and supremacist or separatist right-wing Christian Identity and similar ideologies. The fact that these organizations have crossed paths and that there are known common elements such as drugs, fundraising and illegal acts of violence, should raise the suspicions of the investigator and open the door to further investigation of social and organizational networking.
There are approximately 72 fusion centers in the United States post-9/11. The majority of these centers operate ethnocentrically, based on the cultures goals and objectives of their local and state agencies. The Department of Homeland Security as well as the Department of Justice has worked diligently to provide federal guidance and over watch. But this effort has generally failed because of the “push and pull” dynamics that have always driven federal and state politics. The Department of Defense has even weighed in at some of these centers. It is a near impossible task for these agencies to fuse and overcome organizational cultures especially when they are driven by opposing goals and objectives.
Understanding these dynamics is critical to success. Fusion centers in an effort to comply with or work with federal agencies have tended to move towards the production of intelligence products at a strategic level. These information sets in many cases have little value to the local officer or investigator working the beat or in the local jurisdiction. That is not to say information that is produced does not have value. It is to say that operational intelligence develops at the ground level and that successful operational intelligence can be developed by creating a much better understanding of the strategic level. This will require not only strategic data analysis, but for tactical data on the ground to be rapidly collected, analyzed and fused with other available non-tactical data. Much like SWAT teams developed out of necessity in the 60s and 70s, tactical information must now be collected, analyzed and fused rapidly.
If the statement is true, that the cartels have engaged in insurgency inside the United States and that these transnational criminal elements are now operating within the boundaries of nearly every city inside of America, then law enforcement intelligence becomes equally or more valuable than military intelligence with respect to providing counterinsurgency operations. US policy and legislation must be reviewed and constructed so that this dynamic shift of what was once an international problem, has now become a domestic threat. It is a well known fact that the criminals and terrorists have used the openness of American culture and the legal system to operate nearly uninhibited for years.
The ability of state and local law enforcement and intelligence combined with the efforts of private sector security should not be overlooked. It is not sufficient or even recommended to extend these responsibilities to warriors coming off the battlefield. Specifically, federal jobs should not be extended to veteran’s preference and other programs designed to employ veterans at the federal level. Building federal bureaucracy is not the answer. Incentives to allow local and state agencies, as well as private business to hire, educate and develop veterans is a much better approach and has long-lasting economic impacts as well as helps to develop the network necessary to combat domestic terror where it originates and where it operates. The experience gained by veterans on the battlefield and in their various assignments will aid them in becoming productive law enforcement, intelligence and private security personnel. In the long run this approach also allows the veteran to learn business and creative approaches to networking and relationship building, which also has positive economic short and long-term implications. To overlook the experience base, available training and especially the available intelligence that is already at the fingertips of the agencies that are already on the ground will result in more bloated and expensive House Bills and federal projects. To fail to inject experience and know-how, such as suggested with military veterans, will also result in more spending, short term careers, federal economic exhaustion and in the end, will fail to accomplish the mission of domestic security.
Estimates indicate that more than 80% of the United States critical infrastructure and key resources belong to private sector companies and organizations. Generally relationships already exist between local law enforcement and private sector security operations. Efforts to reengage military veterans into these dynamics, so that operational and battle experience may be used to combat near future domestic conflicts are something that should be immediately addressed. Law enforcement agencies and fusion centers must receive better training with respect to the dynamics of countering terrorism and understanding where street crime now provides national and international networking opportunities for transnational criminal organizations.
The battle to protect the domestic homeland of the United States will be fought at the local level. Significant effort must be given to educating the American populace and building relationships between citizens, law enforcement and the federal government. In essence this becomes a strategic implication to the greater issue of information warfare as it relates to domestic counter terrorism. During the 80s and 90s law enforcement initiated programs such as Community Oriented Policing (COP) and Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design (CPTED). These programs later initiated a movement nationwide that became known as Intelligence Led Policing (ILP). These programs work. After 9/11, and after the rise of the Department of Homeland Security, billions of dollars have been spent on glitz and glamour and programs that were designed to deliver a silver bullet for countering the problem of terrorism. Just as with any organization, sports team or any dynamic endeavor, it is critical to never lose touch with the fundamentals.
As the Department of Defense begins to pull back from a global multi-theater operational tempo, it will be easy for the federal government to absorb the reverse moving inertia of individuals needing jobs and to answer the political rhetoric of what comes next. If there were ever a time for the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to lead, that time is now. It is the one federal agency that has the ability to accomplish and force multiply the goals and objectives described as a result of this research. There is much more data to support this study and much more should be said. However, the bottom line is that globalization has created a global community and with that creation comes both good and evil. DHS has been responsible for massive levels of waste and abuse. However, DHS is also full of good people who have come to understand these problems. The looming crisis of domestic insurgency and terrorism should become the catalyst around which the Department of Homeland Security finally defines its existence and justifies its position among federal agencies and the intelligence community. It is also the one organization, aside from the Department of Justice that has the opportunity to build the bridge to state and local law enforcement and to empower both law enforcement and private sector to provide real ground-level protection to a nation under siege.
Barkun, M. (1994). Religion and the racist right, the origins of the Christian identity movement. Chapel Hill, NC, The University of North Carolina Press.
Border Patrol Special Coordination Center. (2003). Officer Safety Bulletin 03-013, Terrorist Organizations in Mexico (BPSCC on November 12, 2003, and re-published in its entirety by the PSA Unit at LA CLEAR) Specially prepared for all ONDCP High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area Programs.
Collins, J., & Adcox, S., Associated Press, (12/15/2011). Aryan Nations leader sentenced for fraud in SC, Retrieved from http://news.yahoo.com/aryan-nations-leader-sentenced-fraud-sc-221841654.html
Emerson, S. (2002). American jihad. New York, NY: Simon & Schuster
George, J. & Wilcox, L. (1996). American extremists, militias, supremacists, klansmen, communists, & others. Amherst, New York, Prometheus Books.
Huntington, S. P. (2004). Who are we? The challenges to America’s national identity. New York, New York, Simon & Schuster Paperbacks.
Juergensmeyer, M. (2003). Terror in the mind of God, the global rise of religious violence (3rd ed.). Berkeley and Los Angeles, CA, The University of California Press
Scheuer, M. (2006). Through our enemies’ eyes, Osama bin Laden, radical Islam, and the future of America (Revised ed.). Washington, DC, Potomac Books, Inc.
© 2012-2017 David Henderman, CPP, OSINetwork (Reprint is permissible with credit and notice to source via firstname.lastname@example.org)